I. INTRODUCTION
Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires.
1
Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, 2 Wu turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the information economy. 3 To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu provides a unique view of competition in the information economy that substantially deviates from mainstream antitrust theory. 4 First, Wu contends that "information monopolies" are pervasive in the information economy. 5 Wu's "monopolists" include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. 6 In The Master Switch and an article entitled In the Grip of the New Monopolists, Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power; requiring more aggressive oversight and regulation. 7 Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. 8 He claims "[i]nformation industries . . . can never be properly understood as 'normal' industries," and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, "are alone inadequate for the regulation of information industries." 9 Wu believes that because information industries "traffic in forms of individual expression" they are "fundamental to democracy," and should, therefore, be subject to greater regulatory treatment. 10 Third, in contrast to current competition law's focus on horizontal agreements, Wu desires reinvigorated regulatory enforcement addressing "the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power" in the information sectors.
11 He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech 
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Id. (stating also, incorrectly, that cable operators have a monopoly over broadband Internet service); see also THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 1, at 303.
8. THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 1, at 303. 9.
Id. at 301-02, 03. 10. Id. at 301-02. This argument may be at odds with the First Amendment, since courts use a higher level of legal scrutiny on media-focused regulations.
11. Id. at 307.
II. THE SEPARATIONS PRINCIPLE
A. The Proposal
In the final chapter of The Master Switch, Wu outlines his Separations Principle for the information economy, 16 a framework of industrial organization that, if adopted, would radically expand antitrust enforcement in information technology markets and grant vast new powers to federal regulators. 17 The computer industry has changed to new modes of competition, which we do not yet fully understand. The determinants of computer industry structure A Separations Principle would mean the creation of a salutary distance between each of the major functions or layers in the information economy. It would mean that those who develop information, those who own the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another. 18 Wu concedes that it is radical to contemplate placing these "constitutional" restrictions on private actors, but says his idea is inspired by a long line of policy reformers, like Justice Brandeis and President Andrew Jackson, who had similar ideas regarding the dangers of market concentration and power. 19 Wu insists that this structural remedy "is not a regulatory approach but rather a constitutional approach to the information economy" because he models it on the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 20 This is an especially inapt comparison, however, because the Constitution focuses on constraining the powers of government, not businesses. As media historian Paul Starr noted in a review of The Master Switch, Wu "doesn't really mean constitutional in a 'formal' sense. Actually, what he means is regulation-he just can't bring himself to admit it."
21 It makes little difference how Wu describes his proposal. The practical result of his Separations Principle would be welfare-reducing regulation of the information economy.
B. A New Spin on an Old Debate
Concerns about the benefits and harms of vertical integration were largely resolved decades ago in the economics and antitrust literature. Wu is dissatisfied with the state of competition in the information economy and does not believe that the antitrust agencies-with their focus on social welfare calculations, efficiencies, and horizontal relationships-can prevent the sort of societal and competitive harms about which he is offer . . . excellent opportunities for monopolization . . . . Modest interventions (banning certain clearly anticompetitive practices, for example) will have very small impacts. Only quite substantial interventions (structural ones) are likely to be efficacious. concerned. 22 Wu disapproves of the economic orthodoxy today that tolerates what he regards as "industrial dominations" and "imperial growth and overreach" 23 -no doubt referring to the general acceptance in antitrust theory of Chicago School economics, 24 the school of thought that displaced the interventionist Harvard School approach in the 1970s. In the end, marketplace evidence supported Chicago School's economic analysis relative to the Harvard School's structural focus. 25 He is troubled by Americans' "relative indifference to the danger of private power," the "sanctification of private property," 26 and the current interpretation and enforcement of antitrust statutes. 27 In Wu's estimation, Chicago Schoolstyle "economic vitality" depends "on the freedom of the economic system to rise and fall, crash and burn." 28 The problem, Wu says, is that respected economic thought accepts the booms and busts "as intrinsic to the freemarket system . . . ." 29 In light of the current state of antitrust enforcement, he says, a radical overhaul of competition law is needed.
Whether intentional or not, Wu's call for renewed focus on vertical relationships resembles the so-called inhospitality tradition in antitrust, which was characterized by a deep suspicion of vertically integrated firms because they, allegedly, can foreclose entry of competitors and otherwise 22 . THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 1, at 307. harm competition. 30 During that era, decades ago, antitrust policy was designed, in the words of a federal court of appeals, to "perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other." 31 The Chicago School and the rise of transaction cost economics, however, revolutionized economists' interpretation of non-standard contracts and ultimately replaced the inhospitality tradition in the late 1970s. 32 Consequently, current economic thinking has a greater appreciation for the benefits of vertical integration in promoting inter-brand competition and innovation in distribution, and courts applying the antitrust laws have generally been persuaded by this approach. With surprising frankness, Wu rejects the modern approach and argues that "what was understood in the 1970s, and what needs to be understood again, is the role of . . . restrictions in preserving both the free market of goods and services and the free market of ideas."
33
Wu's central contention in the book is that U.S. industrial structure determines the limits of free speech. 34 The information economy comprises the "speech industry," he says, and since speech is carried on privately owned platforms he worries that private actors will limit free speech. 35 The first is the insistence that the exclusive goal of antitrust adjudication, the sole consideration the judge must bear in mind, is the maximization of consumer welfare. The judge must not weight against consumer welfare any other goal, such as the supposed social benefits of preserving small businesses against superior efficiency. Second, the Chicagoans applied economic analysis more rigorously than was common at the time to test the propositions of the law and to understand the impact of business behavior on consumer welfare."); Edwin J. his mentor, Harvard University law professor Lawrence Lessig, 36 Wu seems to accept that he cannot displace the dominant role of Chicago School doctrine in modern antitrust law and its acceptance in the federal courts, so he attempts to highlight a compelling reason for intervention into the information economy. 37 That compelling reason is the unique role of speech in an effective democracy.
Antitrust practice today, Wu says, is unsuitable for the information economy since speech is so intertwined.
38 He says information industries, which carry speech, are just different from "normal" commodity industries. 39 These industries are fundamental to democracy and the efficiencies and utility with which antitrust concerns itself misses the bigger picture. 40 Behind every political revolution or genocide is not "orange juice, heating oil, [or] running shoes," but a partnership with mass media. 41 Wu suggests that without a Separations Principle, vertically integrated firms in the information economy will be tempted to engage in damaging private censorship like the film industry did in earlier decades. 37. THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 1, at 308-19. 38. THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 1, at 303-04 (noting that antitrust "laws alone are inadequate for the regulation of information industries . . . [T] here is the problem of taking an after-the-fact approach to a commodity so vital to our basic liberties: a framework that has worked well enough for oil and aluminum is ultimately unsuited to an industry whose substrate is speech.").
39. Adoption of the Separations Principle means both the dissolution of existing vertically integrated media entities and the prevention of future mergers that would result in vertical market power. 44 To implement the Separations Principle, Wu proposes three complementary responses. First, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") will be the primary enforcer of these vertical separations. The FCC, he says, currently has the authority to block mergers and compel divestitures in accordance with the Separations Principle and should act immediately to prevent further harms. 45 Wu is not convinced that the FCC could perpetually play neutral umpire in this role, however, and fears industry capture or influence, which leads to his second proposed response. 46 Should the FCC fail at preventing a merger across categories or fail to enforce separations, the antitrust agencies-the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") Antitrust Division-will need to step in. 47 Even then, Wu says, it would be difficult to force this regime on an unwilling industry. He hopes industry players would adopt norms of openness and compliance; only then could the Separations Principle achieve its objectives. 48 Wu's justification for the Separations Principle is that eliminating vertical integration would prevent "one layer from smothering the others."
49 This is a more traditional competition rationale for antitrust and other forms of regulation. We address this concern in section III.
III. COMPETITION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Under current antitrust law, vertical restraints and integration are very rarely determined to be illegal per se. 50 Relative to the inhospitality era, vertical mergers are infrequently blocked and concerns about vertical merger consequences have been "essentially forgotten," according to two 43 reviewers of the vertical integration literature. 51 Firms using vertical restraints and integration are constrained by competition from other producers, 52 and vertical arrangements can increase interbrand competition. 53 Further, because of the ambiguous welfare effects of this type of integration and the costs of disintegration, structural separation of vertically integrated firms is a rarely used remedy in antitrust. 54 Wu accepts that his Separations Principle sacrifices some of the benefits of industry concentration and that this will reduce some social welfare. 55 He suggests these sacrifices are worth it to gain new forms of speech and the technical innovation that would otherwise be excluded for the sake of "perfection and empire." 56 Many readers may be puzzled that Wu recommends such a drastic shift in industrial organization policy in the information industries. By Wu's own account, we "live in what is in some ways an informational golden age. Television, the Internet, film, and mobile devices each force one another to become better." 57 Why, then, break up some of the most innovative companies in the world after they have brought us this golden age? The reason, he says, lies in foreseeable and probable future risks. The convergence of all media channels into a single distribution platform-the Internet-makes the entire system imminently at risk of "a new imperial age."
58 He lists possible controllers of the master switch: NBCU-Comcast; AT&T; Apple; and maybe Google. 59 Because we cannot know which firm will seize the switch, Wu's final chapter argues, we must compel separations of these firms before it is too late.
Aside from its speculative nature, the economics of industrial organization do not portend a likelihood of a single owner of the Internet. Underlying Wu's concern is the concentration of private power and the ability of vertically integrated firms to exclude existing competitors, new rivals, and technological innovations that might displace incumbents. Antitrust is a form of common law and subject to change, 60 so it is worthwhile to examine this new challenge to the prevailing enforcement norms should Wu's proposal gain traction. This section argues that these fears are not supported by economic evidence. The information economy is competitive and firms have incentives to open their platforms to horizontal and vertical complements, but there are also efficiency benefits available to vertically integrated firms. We make the case that it would be a mistake to sacrifice the substantial competitive and efficiency benefits present in vertical integration to prevent the speculative future harms to competition and, by extension, free speech.
A. Benefits of Complements and Tying
Here we consider the vertical arrangements between information creators and information hardware makers (buckets one and three under Wu's scheme). Wu's fears stem from the ability of firms to exclude rivals or speech. Since the rise of the Chicago School in the 1970s, antitrust scholars generally have been skeptical of these sorts of claims about vertical integration because a firm should normally have incentives to deal reasonably with providers of complementary applications. 61 Engaging in behavior that discriminates against complements often devalues the platform, 62 and this is true in the information economy. That firms internalize complementary externalities does not mean platform proprietors will never favor their own affiliates 63 (an issue to which Wu is sensitive, given his views on net neutrality). It does mean, however, that platform proprietors generally do not have an economic incentive to exclude competitors in ways that distort competition and harm consumers. Since firms can sometimes lower transaction costs by replacing a competitor's complement with their own product, lower costs and greater convenience can be passed on to consumers. 64 Favoring affiliates, then, can increase consumer welfare compared to bargaining with an independent firm or competitor. Wu cites an example where Apple was forced to decide whether to permit a complementary service or exclude it, but he mischaracterizes the reason Apple decided to permitt a competing service. 65 While Skype does compete directly with Apple's FaceTime, Apple's decision not to prohibit Skype on its phones is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior. Since discriminating against complements often devalues the platform, it is at best incomplete for Wu to say that Apple allowed Skype on its iPhone because Apple was abiding by powerful tech norms that discourage blocking applications ("apps"). 66 While norms might discourage firms from blocking apps from competitors, those norms are always present and do not explain why Apple allows Skype but prohibits other competing services on its phones. This selective discrimination by Apple is consistent with profitmaximizing behavior because sometimes exclusion will devalue a platform (here, the iPhone) and sometimes exclusion will actually increase a platform's value to consumers. Skype is a popular voice-over internet protocol ("VoIP") application with over 600 million users. 67 Apple is infamous for its heavy-handed policies toward third-party apps, 68 In common technology parlance these are the so-called walled gardens, which refer to firms inhibiting interoperability with downstream products. Apple's iPhones, for instance, are sold with free iCloud storage and Siri voice recognition features, to the exclusion of rival offerings. Likewise, Google Android smartphones use Google's search engine and other Google services and apps by default. While section 3 of the Clayton Act could be interpreted to prohibit these sorts of tying arrangements, 71 antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp notes that "most economists and others interested in antitrust law believe [tying] is rarely competitively harmful."
72 For one, tying may reduce the costs of information and oversearching, 73 and that seems to be the primary competitive advantage of walled gardens. Much of Apple devices' popularity seems to arise from these informational benefits. 74 The Apple brand connotes a certain quality to consumers-the product will be sleek, intuitive to use, and relatively free of software vulnerabilities to viruses and trojans. Apple products have gained this beneficial reputation precisely because it has a closed system that ties apps to Apple devices. 75 Much of the iPhone's success is because it meshes so well with the downstream tied services. Competitors in the mobile operating system and handset markets are not as popular, in part, because they have not leveraged the competitive benefits of vertically closed systems. Firms do have incentives to allow competing services on their systems. Whether a firm will allow competing services requires a careful balancing. The fact that consumers flock to closed devices like the iPhone, iPad, and Amazon Kindle, knowing full well these devices are tied to upstream apps and services, is a powerful indictment of Wu's position that proprietary systems harm consumers. By all indications, consumer welfare is enhanced by these firms reducing costly searches and other informational impediments through vertical arrangements. Dissolving a firm that possesses both information creation and hardware abilities-as the Separations Principle mandates 77 -would eliminate these types of proconsumer and pro-competitive tying arrangements.
B. Efficiency Benefits
Now we consider vertical arrangements between information creators, who produce audio and visual content, and information distributors, like wireline and wireless networks (buckets one and two in Wu's scheme). These sorts of mergers are rarer when compared to combinations involving information creators and hardware makers, but the efficiencies provided by these mergers are also understood. Today it is accepted that vertical integrations involving networks and content are often motivated by firms seeking substantial efficiencies. 78 In contrast to the antitrust doctrines that prevailed in the middle of the 20th centurydoctrines Herbert Hovenkamp characterized as "unreasonably hostile" to vertical mergers 79 -antitrust officials today recognize that vertical integration of the factors of production often result in pro-competitive efficiencies. 80 In many instances, firms will acquire upstream or downstream complements because merging allows the firm to avoid the costs of negotiating with upstream and downstream firms for access to complementary goods. Firms achieve efficiencies by integrating vertically since nonintegrated firms are frequently subject to opportunistic behavior from upstream or downstream companies; 81 this is particularly true in industries with rapid technology change. 82 Opportunism and hold-up occur because markets have taken notice, and we will likely see more of these vertical tying agreements in the future. all bilateral contracts are incomplete and can result in ex post bargaining and contractual performance problems. 83 Economist Ronald H. Coase discussed this problem as it relates to manufacturers: if a car manufacturer makes large capital investments in a manufacturing plant, it may be subject to opportunism by a specialized distributor who knows the manufacturer risks having new but unused equipment if the distributor does not reach an agreement with it. 84 Even the mere threat of hold-up by the supplier can coerce a manufacturing firm into lowering its price to average variable cost, and this risk often harms consumers since the firm "would have to cover this cost, by passing it on to its purchaser as part of the price of inputs."
85
These hold-up threats are common in the information economy because firms typically own specialized assets, like television programming, advertisement deals, and programming bundles that are prone to hold-up. 86 To avoid these contracting issues, firms explore alternative governance arrangements-like backwards merger-to prevent ex post rent extraction. 87 Hold-up problems have made the videodistribution industry particularly volatile and competitive in recent years. In addition to high-profile disputes like DirecTV-Viacom, where 20 million satellite subscribers lost twenty-six Viacom-owned channels for over a week when the two companies could not agree, 88 Netflix lost its access to content from the Starz network after refusing to feature tiered pricing for this content. 89 In addition, other studios and content providers have raised prices for Netflix to access and use their content as a response to Netflix's success. 90 (Feb. 27, 2012) , http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/business/media/oncefilm-focused-netflix-shifts-to-tv-shows.html ("The pivot to TV reruns was necessitated in part by the tightening of the movie spigot by major movie studios. Fearing that Netflix might grow too popular or powerful, the studios 'have decided to dramatically raise prices' for films and shows.").
enter the content production market, and it is now being said that Netflix resembles a nascent version of premium-content provider HBO 91 (a development that would be, as one commentator said, "Hollywood's worst nightmare" 92 ). Additionally, Hulu, which mostly features streaming of network television shows, is also now offering several original scripted series. Indicative of its growing competitive threat to the traditional video distributors upon which Hulu depends for content, Hulu recently sat down with advertisers to pitch programming-a ritual typically reserved only for cable channels and network broadcasters. 93 Netflix's and Hulu's production of their own content means they can now bargain harder with studios that seek to raise their prices to distributors. 94 In addition to the actions by Netflix and Hulu, Amazon is now creating original book (Amazon Publishing) 95 and video content (Amazon Studios). 96 By backwards integrating and creating their own content, these firms are preventing the studios from holding them hostage, and they can negotiate lower prices in licensing deals which benefits consumers. These sorts of business models are exactly what antitrust scholarship predicts when firms face hold-up problems from suppliers of an input. "To avoid this transaction cost, the [firm] might integrate backwards, taking on the manufacturing process itself, thereby avoiding a transaction, eliminating the prospect of opportunism, and minimizing the cost of obtaining the input." 97 Under a separations regime in which vertical integration across platforms is prohibited, however, distributors would be prevented from entering the content market. Vertical divestiture would prevent practices that are present in competitive markets like these, and would prevent the resulting price competition. Market developments like those discussed are why current antitrust doctrine "still generally presumes that vertical agreements, vertical extension, and vertical mergers are unobjectionable unless a fact-intensive investigation shows otherwise." 98 Under most circumstances, profit maximizing verticalintegration decisions are efficient, not just from the firms' but also from the consumers' points of view. Although there are isolated studies that contradict this claim, the vast majority support it. Moreover, even in industries that are highly concentrated so that horizontal considerations assume substantial importance, the net effect of vertical integration appears to be positive in many instances. We therefore conclude that, faced with a vertical arrangement, the burden of evidence should be placed on competition authorities to demonstrate that that arrangement is harmful before the practice is attacked. Furthermore, we have found clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are imposed . . . are usually detrimental to consumers. Given the weight of the evidence, it behooves government agencies to reconsider the validity of such restrictions.
104
This literature survey is especially relevant here since it reviews several studies examining cable TV and film distribution integrations-the types of 99. BORK, supra note 32, at 55.. 100. See Bruce M. Owen, Antitrust and Vertical Integration in "New Economy" Industries, 38 REV. INDUST. ORG. 363, 381. ("Empirical evidence that vertical integration or vertical restraints are harmful is weak, compared to evidence that vertical integration is beneficial-again, even in cases where market power appears to be present. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that prophylactic regulation is not necessary, and may well reduce welfare by deterring efficient investments. Sound policy is to wait for ex post evidence of harm to justify interventions in specific cases. The conditions that would trigger such intervention should be as concrete and specific as possible, in order to reduce perceived investment risk.").
101 In every vertical merger or contractual agreement, there are two countervailing factors: (1) an increase in foreclosure; and (2) an increase in efficiency or other cost reductions. 107 These two factors typically result in ambiguous or positive effects on consumers, which is why antitrust authorities are so hesitant to enforce vertical separations. Since there is substantial evidence of cost reductions in the information economy, a per se separations rule would be premature and probably welfare-reducing without compelling evidence of pervasive vertical foreclosure effects and minimal benefits to consumers 108 -evidence Wu never proffers.
C. Competition in the Information Economy: Case Studies
The case studies that follow show that markets tend to self-correct quickly when vertical integration or vertical mergers fail to produce the value to either the firm or consumers that was originally imagined.
AOL-Time Warner
Just a decade ago, AOL was perceived as the primary threat to online openness and was thought to possess an unassailable position of digital dominance. For a time, it was easy to see why some were worried. Thirty million subscribers were willing to pay $20 per month to get a guided tour of AOL's walled-garden version of the Internet. 109 Then, AOL and media titan Time Warner announced a historic megamerger that had some critics, such as Norman Solomon and Robert Scheer, predicting the rise of "new totalitarianisms" and a corporate "Big Brother," respectively. 108 . One of the benefits of vertical integration in an industry with rapidly changing technology lies in the coordination of investment and production decisions. At the present time, when the technology for delivering telecom services is undergoing a sea change and the very nature of those services is changing dramatically, any decision to mandate a move away from vertical integration would be very risky. Crandall, supra note 82, at 23. See also Owen, supra note 100, at 381, (arguing that "there is no basis for an a priori assumption that vertical integration is welfare-reducing," which makes "prophylactic regulation . . . not necessary," and that policymakers should "wait for ex post evidence of harm to justify interventions in specific cases").
109 124 As with the unwinding of the AOL-Time Warner deal, little mention was made in the reporting about the divestiture of DirecTV of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the concerns about vertical integration raised by the critics. 122. Then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would "result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape." He continued, "With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices." Gen. ("PDAs") dawned during this period, but featured a series of overhyped devices, such as Apple's "Newton," that failed to catch on. In the early 2000s, however, a host of new players and devices entered the market, many of which are still major players today, including LG, Sony, Samsung, Siemens, and HTC. Importantly, the sector began dividing into handsets versus OS. Leading mobile OS makers have included Microsoft, Palm, Symbian, BlackBerry (RIM), Apple, and Android (Google).
126
The sector continues to undergo constant change. Palm smartphones were wildly popular for a brief time and brought many innovations to the marketplace. 127 Palm underwent many ownership and management changes, however, and rapidly faded from the scene.
128 After buying Palm in 2010, HP announced that it would use Palm's WebOS platform in a variety of new products.
129 That effort failed, and HP then announced that it would transition WebOS to an open-source software product. 130 Similarly, RIM's BlackBerry was the dominant smartphone device for a time, but it has recently been decimated. 131 BlackBerry's rollercoaster ride has left it "trying to avoid the hall of fallen giants," in the words of an early 2012 New York Times headline.
132 Although the company once accounted for more than half of the American smartphone market, today its share has slipped to ten percent. 133 Microsoft also had a huge lead in licensing its Windows Mobile OS to high-end smartphone handset makers until Apple and Android disrupted its business. Famously, many commentators denigrated Apple's entry into the smartphone business since many industry analysts believed the market was mature.
135 Just a few years later, Nokia's profits and market share have plummeted, 136 and Google purchased the struggling Motorola. 137 Meanwhile, Palm is dead and Microsoft is struggling to win back market share lost to Apple and Google.
138
"The violence with which new platforms have displaced incumbent mobile vendor fortunes continues to surprise," says wireless industry analyst Horace Dediu. 139 He notes that Nokia's Symbian platform went from 47 percent share to 16 percent in three years, Microsoft's phone platforms went from 12 percent to 1 percent, RIM's went from 17 percent to 12 percent, and other platforms went from 21 percent to zero. 140 Meanwhile, over a two-year period, Google's Android OS went from zero to 48 percent and Apple's iOS went from 2 percent to 19 percent. 141 Of course, in a marketplace this dynamic, Apple and Google could wake up in Dvorak believed the mobile handset business was already locked up by the era's major players. "This is not an emerging business. In fact it's gone so far that it's in the process of consolidation with probably two players dominating everything, Nokia Corp. a few years and find that they too have been displaced from their current perches atop the smartphone hill.
142
Given the importance of mobile broadband in consumer markets and the vicious competition in this sector and others, it strains credulity to say that breakup of tech companies via the Separations Principle is needed to ensure competition and free speech. Interestingly, this dynamic change has not kept Wu from complaining about the nature of competition in the smartphone sector. He has bemoaned the state of competition in this sector and referred to the practices of carriers as "outrageous and perhaps illegal" even as market influence has rapidly shifted away from carriers and toward handset makers and OS developers. 143 Because of the efficiency justifications described above, and the changing nature of these markets, Wu's proposed per se antitrust enforcement is unsupported. The preceding case studies provide compelling evidence that even the mightiest "information empires" can crumble and fall-and in very short order. Despite what Wu claims, there is little reason to believe "this time is different" and that the information economy is, for once, immune from dynamic, disruptive changes. Escape from any platform is reasonably easy and innovation continues at a healthy clip. If future technology platform competition is dynamic like the past twenty years has been, preemptive vertical separations-like those proposed by Wu-would undermine the ability of firms to aggressively innovate and attempt to dominate the market.
D. Dynamic, Schumpeterian Change vs. Static Equilibrium Analysis
The modern information economy is the living embodiment of what Austrian-born economist Joseph Schumpeter famously described as the "perennial gale of creative destruction." 144 The Schumpeterian paradigm and other dynamic competition models best capture the nature of competition and innovation in today's digital marketplace. "Innovative risk-takers are constantly shaking things up and displacing yesterday's lumbering, lethargic giants." 146 In markets built largely upon binary code, the pace and nature of change has become hyperSchumpeterian: unrelenting and unpredictable. New disruptions flow from many unexpected quarters as innovators launch groundbreaking products and services while devising new ways to construct cheaper and more efficient versions of existing technologies. Change has been constant, uneven, and highly disruptive but it has also led to the progress and innovation seen flowing through the information sector over the past two decades.
There is no static end-state, "perfect competition," or "market equilibrium" in today's information-technology marketplace.
147 Change and innovation are chaotic, nonlinear, and paradigm-shattering. 148 Schumpeter notes how, in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization . . . competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other . . . [it] acts not only when in being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks. Antitrust scholars J. Gregory Sidak and David J. Teece explain why this dynamic model better describes real-world marketplace competition:
The adjective "dynamic" is a shorthand descriptor for a variety of rigorously competitive activities such as significant product differentiation and rapid response to change, whether from innovation or simply from new market opportunities ensuing from changes in taste or other forces of disequilibrium. Dynamic competition is, in fact, more intuitive and much closer to today's everyday view of competition than is the stylized notion of static competition routinely depicted in textbooks. 150 While static or "perfect competition" models assume away innovation and are preoccupied with competitive equilibrium, dynamic models revolve around disequilibrium and assume the only constant is change.
What is most important to economic progress, therefore, is the ongoing process of constant experimentation and spontaneous discovery that allows new business models and organizational structures to emerge in response to market signals. Sidak and Teece note that "[t]he basic framework employed in discussions about innovation, technology policy, and competition policy is often remarkably naïve, highly incomplete, and burdened by a myopic focus on market structure as the key determinant of innovation."
151 Additionally, Sidak and Teece explain:
Market share may be altogether irrelevant in some cases because markets may exist in which innovation is so characteristic and sustained that firms compete not merely for market share, but for markets as a whole A firm's monopoly today may say little about the firm's prospects one, two, or five years in the future.
152
The particular danger of the static equilibrium mindset is that the same new innovators and innovations that obtain success and scale rapidly as a result of this process are sometimes thought to possess problematic market power. Accusations of monopoly quickly follow, as they do in Wu's work. Coase notes that if an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or another-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of unexplainable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent. 153 This is why a short-term fixation on market share and market power is so problematic.
The static equilibrium model is myopically fixated on short-term market share and price competition while ignoring "competition for innovation," which is what matters most in the more dynamic Schumpeterian model. As Robert Kramer of the DOJ's Antitrust Division noted in a 1999 speech, "[a]s important as price competition is to us, a second major and possibly even greater concern is maintaining competition for innovation." 154 Schumpeter also explained that uneven entrepreneurial gains must be tolerated if innovation is to occur. 155 Economies need innovators to take risks because progress is born from it. 156 Penalizing the risk-takers by trying to level the playing field through rash regulation or antitrust interventions will often sap the entrepreneurial spirit from the marketplace, limit technological innovation, and diminish the possibility of progress and prosperity over the long-haul. 157 Wu's analysis gives little consideration to the possibility that obtaining market power will not adversely impact innovation within the tech sector. Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright explain that "this is a problem if the innovators have forsaken monopoly profits in competition for the field in expectation of future reward, only to find that their reward is made unavailable at the moment they begin to enjoy it." 158 They continue, A purely static, forward-looking assessment will miss the consumer welfare benefits previously enjoyed by consumers of the innovative product and curtail the market because of a present or future expectation that consumers will be harmed.
This has long-run dynamic efficiency effects, chilling the very innovation that might confer initial consumer surplus, but it also may simply miss the mark in a more static sense, punishing conduct that is already consumer-welfare enhancing.
159
Wu's Separations Principle generally ignores these insights and instead proposes that policymakers engage in preemptive, prophylactic market-carving efforts to head-off unproven market-power problems. 160 This discounts the potential for Schumpeterian change even though we have already witnessed repeated waves of such creative destruction reordering the information economy over the past two decades.
E. Openness Concerns
Throughout his work, Wu cites "openness" for networks, platforms, devices, and the like as a primary rationale for regulation, including his proposed Separations Principle. 161 He speaks of "the perennial Manichean contest informing every episode in this book: the struggle between the partisans of the open and the closed, between the decentralized and the consolidated versions of a proper order."
162 Such openness concerns are generally unwarranted or overblown, however. REV. 96, 101 (2011) ("First, if we evaluate Internet competition only by taking a point-intime snapshot of existing competitors, we will probably fail to anticipate the identity and business proposition of disruptive new entrants. Second, in a digital environment with low switching costs between vendors, consumers will flock to new entrants that solve their informational needs-even if the competitors offer a very different solution. As a result, a dominant information provider in one technological niche still faces significant crosselasticities of demand from providers in other technological niches.").
160. meaning from one chapter to another." 165 That probably is not intentional, but simply reflects the complexity of defining these subjective, evolving concepts.
Second, moving beyond definitional deficiencies, even if one grants that some information systems are more "closed" than others, it is evident that there must be a need for some closed devices and platforms or the market would not have supplied them. Building on concerns first articulated by Lessig and Jonathan Zittrain, 166 Wu fears closed systems will become mere "digital appliances" that are not sufficiently "generative." 167 He worries when he sees that devices like Apple's iPad "are computers that have been reduced to a strictly limited set of functions that they are designed to perform extremely well."
168 Needless to say, most consumers will find it hard to sympathize with Wu's complaint that Apple's products work too well, even if the devices are not as open as Wu desires.
Third, it is unclear how an effort to mandate openness would improve consumer welfare. Would consumers be better served if they were offered only devices that arrived totally un-configured? Should the iPhone or iPad, for example, be shipped to market with no applications loaded on the main screen, forcing everyone to go find them on their own? Few people want to program their mobile phones, hack their computers or gaming consoles, or write their own code. Markets serve these populations with specialized devices that offer a diverse array of open and closed choices to fit their specific needs. Further, while opening closed systems, however defined, may produce some beneficial flexibility for consumers, it might also reduce the incentive to create new systems since firms cannot enjoy some of the competitive benefits of closed systems. Whether this would be a net benefit for consumers in the end cannot be determined here, but it is possible that closed systems-which give firms some control and perhaps some added profitability-incented the creation of the high-quality tech products on the market today. 169 What is important is the fact that innovation continues to unfold rapidly in both directions along the open versus closed continuum, and the Separations Principle would stymie evolution. 170 There are more open and 171 Many of the largest "information empires" do not create strict walled gardens; instead they create partially walled gardens and invite many others to enjoy them. One way they do so is by licensing upstream content to other downstream platform providers. For example, Microsoft Office runs on multiple operating systems; Amazon's Kindle service is available via apps on the iPhone and iPad as well as Android devices; Google's many services are available across browsers, phones, tablets, and so on. These trends and strategies remain in constant flux yielding varied forms of pro-consumer innovation.
Finally, most corporate attempts to bottle up information, or close off their platforms, end badly. The walled gardens of the past-CompuServe and America Online, for example-failed in the end: CompuServe no longer exists and AOL has been relegated to an also-ran in the Internet ecosystem.
172 There are few reasons to believe that today's efforts to build such walled gardens would end much differently, in time. 173. Moreover, today's "walled gardens"-Facebook and LinkedIn, for example-are less "walled" than they were in the past. Similarly, "closed" systems and devices are not really so closed. Increasingly, when companies or coders erect walls of any sort, holes form quickly. For example, it usually does not take long for a determined group of hackers to find ways around copy/security protections on various types of content or to "root" or "jailbreak" phones and other devices. Once hacked, users are usually able to configure their devices or applications however they wish, effectively thumbing their noses at developers. This process tends to unfold in a matter of days, even hours, after the release of a new device or operating system. On the other hand, some consumers may prefer the closed systems, but then there is not much consumer-welfare loss.
IV. REAL-WORLD APPLICATION OF THE SEPARATIONS PRINCIPLE
A. Self-Regulation Norms
Wu states that a necessary component of the Separations Principle is that firms voluntarily adopt self-governing norms that ensure vertical separations.
174 This is an unlikely proposition. Firms can take advantage of efficiencies through vertical integration, as discussed previously, so selfregulation would mean voluntarily forfeiting those benefits. Since there are only a few dominant firms in each layer of the information economy, however, it is conceivable that firms could organize to mutually ensure each firm stayed in its respective "bucket," but the anticompetitive effects from this kind of self-regulation are readily apparent. With only a few dominant players at every level, firms may self-regulate to acquire monopoly rents at the horizontal platform they occupy. These firms would no longer be constrained by their large ex-competitors who have exited the market for their own bucket.
Would consumers really be better off if Amazon agreed with Apple to not compete with each other in the information creator and information hardware maker markets? One can imagine Amazon willingly giving up its Kindle business in order to focus on distributing content to e-readers, knowing that Apple would no longer compete in the music and e-reader distribution business. Apple, of course, would probably be happy to no longer compete with Amazon in the e-reader device market if Amazon left the content space. These are the very self-regulating agreements we would expect if firms adopted Wu's desired industry norms. It is apparent, however, that agreements like this resemble collusion and market division between competitors, which are acts currently prosecuted as per se violations by antitrust agencies because the anti-consumer effects are so obvious.
175 These anti-consumer dangers do not disappear if favored by the government through adoption of the Separations Principle.
B. Enforcement Challenges Associated with the Separations Principle
Regarding the "prevention and dissolution" of vertical mergers between the content production, telecom, and electronics sectors, Wu proposes the FCC impose the Separations Principle since it is currently 174. THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 1, at 313. within the FCC's authority to do so; 176 presumably referring to the agency's amorphous "public interest and convenience" standard. 177 In addition to the FCC, Wu says the DOJ and the FTC are needed as backup.
178 Wu acknowledges the public-choice problems involved: "Time and again [the government] has stood beside concentrated power against the underdog at the expense of economic dynamism." 179 In the case of AT&T in the 1980s particularly, the FCC was a large source of the problems the DOJ tried to remedy. 180 While Wu imagines that separations would be fairly nonintrusive-it is a "constitutional" solution, not a "regulatory" one, remember-his Principle would actually result in pervasive and costly regulatory processes.
In his extensive analysis of 20th-century Sherman Act structural remedies, Brookings Institution economist Robert Crandall concludes that structural remedies, particularly vertical divestitures, are often very costly and fail to improve the competitive landscape or consumer welfare. 181 Further, he points out that it can be very difficult to enforce structural remedies in rapidly changing industries. 182 Crandall's conclusions cast doubt on the effectiveness and prudence of adopting a Separations Principle that would preemptively impose structural antitrust remedies. Structural remedies in the past, like the AT&T and Paramount breakups, required years of careful watch by a regulatory body and the courts. 183 In the 1984 AT&T decree, for instance, there were over thirty separate waiver requests filed every year for the first eight years of the decree, each one pending for months or years. 184 The entire information economy is moving incredibly fast, and separated firms would likely be at unforeseen disadvantages as the market transformed, similar to what happened with AT&T. There is reason to believe the fast-moving nature of the information economy would pose more problems for regulators than traditional regulated industries. If the vertical separations imagined by Wu were to be 178. anything like prior dissolutions, the regulatory fights would be constant and require regular vigilance by the FCC to prevent exclusionary conduct.
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To give a taste of what regulation under the Separations Principle would look like, consider some of the high-profile dissolutions that would need to be implemented:
• Apple: Apple would have to be broken up into at least two companies: information creator and hardware maker. The Apple App Store, iTunes, iOS, and other programs would be separated from the iPad, iPod, iPhone, and other Apple devices. Those devices would need to be compatible with other content producers as well. Some device prices would rise since today they are subsidized by carriers, often on the condition of exclusivity.
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• Microsoft: Microsoft would also have to be broken up as an information creator and a hardware maker. Their software, video games, Internet Explorer web browser, and Hotmail email services would need to be separated from their Xbox game-console division, their recently acquired interest in Barnes & Noble's Nook e-reader, and, presumably, their Windows OS. 187 Microsoft's other hardware ventureskeyboards, mice, joysticks, peripherals, and so forth-would also have be moved to the hardware division.
• Amazon: Amazon would probably have to be broken into three companies since it occupies all three buckets. Amazon Web Services, its cloud-computing platform, would be an information distributor-its infrastructure in the information economy. Amazon's Kindle arm would become a separate company, in the hardware maker category. 188 Amazon's presence in the information creator category, featuring books, publishing, CDs, DVDs, software, video, and other products would likewise need to be kept separate.
• Google: Google also occupies all three categories. Google's substantial interest in the Current Communications Group-a smart-grid network-would be placed in the information distributor category, 189 as would the Google Fiber broadband network. 190 Google, of course, is predominantly in the information creator business with services like search, YouTube, Google Maps, Android software, and Gmail. Google's recent $12.5 billion purchase of Motorola Mobility would need to be spun off into the hardware maker category even though the partnership could help Google compete more squarely against Apple.
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• Comcast: Comcast is a major cable operator and ISP, but it also owns cable networks like E!, the Golf Channel, and various sport properties. 192 In 2013, Comcast completed its purchase of NBCUniversal, which produces content like NBC broadcasting and cable channels USA, Bravo, and MSNBC. 193 Comcast would be split into an information creator and a separate information distributor.
• Sony: Sony produces movie and video-game content but also develops hardware, like video game consoles, televisions, music players, and phones, on which that content can be played. 194 These units would need to be separated and some of them spun off.
These are some of the leading names of the information economy, but there are thousands of other information-sector companies operating across dozens of sectors throughout our economy. TechAmerica, a technology industry trade association with diverse membership, uses over fifty North American Industry Classification System ("NAICS") codes to define the U.S. high-technology industry. 195 Although companies choose only one primary NAICS designation, 196 in practice the diversity of goods and services they provide often cuts across multiple industrial classifications. For example, Google's primary NAICS designation is NAICS #517919 ("All Other Telecommunications") even though it would seem more logical for the firm to be housed under NAICS #519130 ("Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals"). 197 Of course, Google could just as easily be classified under NAICS #511210 ("Software Publishers"), where it competes against Microsoft, among others, or under NAICS #334111 ("Electronic Computer Manufacturing"), where it competes against Apple. In other words, it is rare to find a major company in the information economy that operates in just one NAICS field. The crucial point here is that creating firewalls between the buckets Wu proposes would be far more complicated than Wu admits and would entail incessant regulatory interventions to make sure the walls were not breached. More importantly, each new information sector innovation would suddenly be subjected to a regulatory classification proceeding. The costs for those to industries, consumers, and innovation would be significant.
Further, it is not clear that the Separations Principle-without more-would prevent the sort of exclusionary harms Wu fears since there is little competitive difference between vertical integration through ownership or through contract. 198 Would the Principle also require the FCC to examine and prohibit certain vertical contracts? For example, if Apple were divided into two companies-a device company and a content company-and they immediately contracted together for, say, a five-year exclusive deal, this looks much like the status quo (with some contracting costs). Would the FCC need the power to prevent these de facto vertical integrations as well? Astonishingly, Wu suggests that "a Separations regime would take much of the guesswork and impressionism . . . out of the oversight of the information industries." 199 To the extent that his Separations Principle eliminates guesswork and creates more regulatory certainty, it would do so only by creating rigid artificial barriers to market entry across the information economy. That seems to be the kind of "certainty" we can live without. It is doubtful that regulators will possess the requisite knowledge to define present markets in a static sense, or know which vertical contracts will be unduly exclusionary. As F.A. Hayek noted, "[p]rogress by its very nature cannot be planned." 200 As Sidak and Teece argued:
[I]f one is to adopt a forward-looking antitrust analysis, then neither the enforcement agencies nor the courts will likely know which products will be good substitutes in the future. Because innovation produces new products and lowers the cost of existing products, policymakers must include such future products when defining the market, but doing so is quite difficult in many instances . . . .
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Wu's proposed solution, however, ignores these problems.
C. Other Considerations Regarding the Wisdom of the Separations Principle
This section briefly discusses a handful of other considerations that would complicate the creation and ongoing enforcement of Wu's Separations Principle.
Regulatory Capture
Wu rightly points to the danger of regulatory capture in heavily regulated communications and media sectors:
Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government's role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace . . . . Government's tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity . . . [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive.
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But as quickly as Wu raises this problem, he seems to dismiss it. He seems to imagine that a new separations regime will be immune to such tendencies. That is unlikely to be the case. regulatory process and use it for their own ends. 203 Capture theory is closely related to the rent-seeking and political failure theories developed by the public choice school of economics. 204 While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory decisions or developments, it does explain with dismaying consistency how self-interested motives can affect political actions. 205 The traditional normative theory of regulation, which viewed policymakers as enlightened, independent, and benevolent actors, 206 failed to address this problematic, recurring reality, as well as other deficiencies in the political decision-making process. Scholars developed a new, more robust economic theory of regulation to help explain why the traditional paradigm was incomplete. 207 These scholars argued it was inappropriate to assume regulatory intervention was always in the public interest or would always improve consumer welfare. 208 In particular, University of Chicago economist George Stigler's pioneering work in developing this more robust economic theory of regulation revealed how "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits."
209 Alfred Kahn's meticulous study of the regulatory process also identifies how capture was a particular problem for utility sectors:
When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition . . . . Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods. 210 Many other scholars have identified capture as a recurring problem in regulated industries. 211 They concur with UCLA emeritus professor of business economics Harold Demsetz's conclusion that "in utility industries, regulation has often been sought because of the inconvenience of competition." 212 The railroad industry provides a particularly egregious example of such capture. 213 The airline industry presents another such example. 214 online.wsj.com/article/SB124580461065744913.html ("The first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was set up to regulate railroad freight rates in the 1880s. Soon thereafter, Richard Olney, a prominent railroad lawyer, came to Washington to serve as Grover Cleveland's attorney general. Olney's former boss asked him if he would help kill off the hated ICC. Olney's reply, handed down at the very dawn of Big Government, should be regarded as an urtext of the regulatory state: 'The Commission . . . is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things . . . . The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.'"). Kahn to the CAB chairmanship, the overall effect of board policies tended to freeze the industry more or less in its configuration of 1938. One policy, for example, forbade price competition. Instead the CAB ordinarily required that all carriers flying a certain route charge the same rates for the same class of customer . . . . A second policy had to do with the CAB's stance toward the entry of new companies into the business. Charged by Congress with the duty of ascertaining whether or not 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity' mandated that new carriers should receive a certificate to operate, the board often ruled simply that no applicant met these tests. In fact, over the entire history of the CAB, no new trunkline carrier had been permitted to join the sixteen that existed in 1938. And those Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board) to promote cartelization and market protectionism. When capture occurs, it lessens not only the innovation that would flow from other market entrants and entrepreneurs, but also the innovation of the regulated entity itself, which shifts its focus to controlling the regulatory process and sheltering itself from disruptive change.
One can debate the chicken-and-egg question of which came firstthe assignment of utility status or the capture of regulators by special interests-but the inquiry is largely irrelevant. Capture is a recurring problem within such sectors and undercuts traditional "public interest" rationales for intervention. 215 The FCC, by subjecting the telecommunications, electronics, and content-production industries to the Separations Principle, would be exposed to increased rent-seeking behavior by some of the most powerful firms in the world. 216 Given the difficulty of what Wu proposes, the risk of capture should not be underestimated.
Global Reach and International Competitiveness
It is unclear how Wu's regime would work for a sector with the global reach of information technology. Companies operating in these sectors often serve a global audience and possess many global affiliates. While these affiliates must conform their business practices to the host country's laws and norms, the application of the Separations Principle in one country-especially the United States-would have a profound effect on how affected firms do business in many other markets. It would be difficult, for example, to operate a structurally separated enterprise in the United States but maintain a vertically integrated operation in other countries. It would be more likely that affected firms would simply relocate primary operations to countries where firms enjoy a more hospitable regulatory environment and then determine how to deal with importation to markets governed by Wu's Separations Principle.
This makes it clear that Wu's proposed regime could also deleteriously affect the competitiveness of U.S.-based firms who currently operate or export globally. Currently, the United States is a leader in many of the information sectors and Wu's Separations Principle would affect that. It is unlikely that U.S.-based firms, currently considered global leaders in their fields would be able to maintain their global competitive advantage if stripped of the ability to capitalize on the benefits of vertical integration.
Agency Conflicts and Administrative and Due Process Issues
Wu envisions a regulatory framework where the FCC would be the primary enforcer of the Separations Principle and the FTC and the DOJ would supplement the FCC's oversight. 217 In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, there is reason to doubt that these antitrust agencies could actually exercise this type of oversight. For decades, the Court wrestled with whether an extensive regulatory regime displaces concurrent antitrust lawsuits. 218 Two Supreme Court cases decided in the past 10 years, Trinko and Credit Suisse, make it much more difficult for the antitrust agencies to bring antitrust cases in regulated industries. 219 Generally, based on these cases, (1) if a regulatory agency has authority to supervise the conduct in question; (2) the agency continuously exercises that authority; and (3) if there is a conflict between the antitrust and regulatory regimes, the FTC and the DOJ cannot bring an antitrust suit regarding that conduct. 220 In both cases, the Court was concerned about non-expert judges and juries erring in competition issues and harming consumer welfare.
221 This is a significant problem since Wu obviously doubts that the FCC, with its checkered past, can objectively exercise its responsibility to keep the buckets separate and not to favor any industry, technology, or firm. If Wu's Principle depends on antitrust oversight from the FTC and the DOJ but they are prohibited from acting under these court decisions, this represents an obstacle to implementing the Separations Principle.
Wu's proposed regulatory paradigm raises other administrative law considerations. As noted, given the power of special interests in gaining regulatory and congressional favors and the conflicting incentives of some regulators, it is unlikely that an agency like the FCC could restrain itself from putting its thumb on the scales for what it deemed the public interest. One needs to look no further than Wu's book and his other writings to see that regulators are often encouraged to be interventionist. Notably, Wu has advocated informal "agency threats" and the use of "threat regimes" to accomplish policy goals that prove difficult to steer though the formal rulemaking process. 222 His "defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts" is justified as follows:
The use of threats instead of law can be a useful choicenot simply a procedural end run. My argument is that the merits of any regulative modality cannot be determined without reference to the state of the industry being regulated. Threat regimes, I suggest, are important and are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid change-under conditions of "high uncertainty." Highly informal regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology or business model, or a practice about which little is known. 223 These threat regimes represent a significant departure from traditional democratic norms of accountable governance and limits on the delegation of legislative and regulatory authority. 224 They would also likely constitute a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. Wu's assumption that threats make even more sense in fast-moving high-tech industries also seems counterintuitive and unwise. 225 "Anyone who predicts the technological future is sure soon to seem foolish," notes George Gilder. "It springs from human creativity and thus inevitably consists of surprise." 226 If a given sector finds itself in such a state of high uncertainty, it seems safe to assume that the state of competition and innovation would be dynamic enough that intervention would not be necessary or wise. Those would be the last sectors regulators should be preemptively micromanaging since they lack the requisite knowledge of whether a market development will harm or benefit consumers in the long-term. This is especially true as it pertains to technological change and change in information markets.
Wu explicitly rejects the present antitrust model, which generally allows firms and innovators to respond to marketplace demands and developments in an evolutionary way, in favor of government intervention and intimidation:
The [wait-and-see] option . . . may sound attractive because it allows the industry to develop in what might be called a natural way. This approach, however, makes a great sacrifice: the public's interest may be entirely unrepresented during the industry's formative period. The risk is that the industry's norms and business models will, effectively, be set without any public input. Waiting for the industry to settle down may result in undesirable practices that prove extremely hard to reverse or influence with rules issued later. To state the matter more colloquially, the industry may be "baked" by the time there is any real oversight or public input.
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Wu does not bother to offer any sort of robust cost-benefit analysis of the probability of such preemptive regulation benefiting consumers versus the probability of some short term harm developing absent such threats. 228 Regardless, when we marry this vision of regulation-viaintimidation 229 to Wu's Separations Principle, 230 the scope of Wu's ambitions becomes obvious. After implementation, the high-tech sectors begin to resemble a mixed-economy model in which decisions are guided by the supposed wisdom of technocratic regulators. 231 We are asked to believe that such a heavy-handed regime will guide America's hightechnology economy down a more innovative path, even if some threats may be necessary to get the job done, and entire segments of the economy must be destroyed and reordered to achieve this vision. 232 It is a breathtaking and radical vision for the future of information technology markets. forcible disintegration of information platforms and providers that operate in the three layers of the information economy that Wu wants to keep strictly quarantined. For vertically integrated companies such as Apple or Microsoft, this requirement would have devastating ramifications. Indeed, for any media operator or information platform, being forced to divest assets or being structurally separated could mean the loss of integrative efficiencies, core competencies, and important product lines. Such breakups might also require companies to sacrifice crucial intellectualproperty rights. 233 Finally, forcible disintegration could mean the loss of a valued part of the firm's labor force, as well as a significant loss of shareholder value. These losses constitute legal grounds for a takings challenge under the Fifth Amendment. 234 At a minimum, regulatory proponents should not be surprised when these matters are litigated by affected companies and lengthy legal wrangling ensues. 235 Litigation would further limit innovation by the regulated entities and others in the field, and would likely chill broader industry investment by both the incumbent social media provider and its potential competitors. 
Fifth Amendment Takings Issues
First Amendment Considerations
Wu believes that because information industries "traffic in forms of individual expression" and are so "fundamental to democracy," they should be subject to differential regulatory treatment. 237 He is troubled that the Constitution prohibits the government from limiting free speech but says nothing to prevent private institutions from doing so.
That the information economy comprises the "speech industry" and that private actors operate in many speech-facilitating platforms cannot-at least under a proper understanding of the First Amendment-serve as an excuse for the sort of sweeping regulation Wu desires. Wu's argument contradicts the thrust of the First Amendment, which has traditionally imposed a higher level of legal scrutiny on media-focused regulatory 233 241 -as proof that media-ownership regulations and other press controls were demanded by the First Amendment to guarantee a certain level of diversity. 242 In essence, media-access advocates say that once a given media provider becomes popular enough, everyone has a right to use it and the First Amendment allows the government to mold media in whatever form it wishes. Of course the First Amendment says nothing of the sort. Importantly, Wu makes the bar to government action even lower with his separations regime. Under Wu's paradigm, the fact that information industries "traffic in forms of individual expression" and are so "fundamental to democracy" would open them to almost unlimited structural regulation. 243 Structural regulations are not purely content-neutral methods of media regulation, however. Christopher S. Yoo has coined the term "architectural censorship" to describe "the tangential, but [important], adverse impact on speech" that structural media regulations can have. 244 By artificially limiting market structures or outputs, structural controls can limit the quantity and quality of media created. 245 The danger with media-access mandates-even when they take the form of structural controls-is that they ultimately transform the First Amendment into an affirmative tool of the state that legislators and regulators can wield to control content and influence the editorial judgments of the press. As Justice Owen Roberts presciently warned fifty years ago in his dissenting opinion in Associated Press v. United States, the case that helped spawn the media-access movement:
The decree here approved may well be, and I think threatens to be, but a first step in the shackling of the press, which will subvert the constitutional freedom to print or to withhold, to print as and how one's reason or one's interest dictates. When that time comes, the state will be supreme and freedom of the state will have superseded freedom of the individual to print, being responsible before the law for abuse of the high privilege.
It is not protecting a freedom, but confining it, to prescribe where and how and under what conditions one must impart the literary product of his thought and research. This is fettering the press, not striking off its chains. 246 Wu's separations regime would "fetter the press" along similar lines and significantly expand the horizons of government power over speechproducing and speech-disseminating industries. As a result, First Amendment values are implicated and litigation becomes more likely.
V. CONCLUSION
Wu's regulatory aims ultimately resemble those from 1950's and 1960's industrial organization theory, which suffered from "[c]asual observations of business behavior . . . , colorful characterizations, eclectic forays into sociology and psychology, descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility." 247 Like the industrial organization theories in vogue during that period, Wu's Separations Principle is a proposition "that contradict[s] economic theory" 248 and should be avoided as preemptive remedy to merely speculative societal harms. The information economy today is dynamic and competitive. A Separations Principle that prevents and dissolves vertical acquisitions would be substantially detrimental to consumers. Instead, we should embrace a different "separations principle" to guide policy: the preservation of a salutary distance between the state and all layers of the information economy.
